

International feeling certainly does not intend to see China given an unfair deal, if anything can be done to level the balance. It is unlucky that the world is so pre-occupied with all its varied troubles elsewhere that it cannot push ahead on the work of assembling collective forces to see to it that fair deals are always given. When civilization becomes a fact rather than a mere twelve-letter word, and when nations are made to conduct their affairs ac-

ording to something the same law as individuals, the test will no longer be that of brute strength. As matters stand, however involved the world may be in a Far Eastern war, it is the way of that world to let the war start first and to try to do something effective later. Perhaps Shaw was right in his speculation that other planets may use this one as a lunatic asylum!

Lukouchiao—Before and After

By K. S. MA (馬國驥)

IT is said that there are two most prominent danger spots in the world, one in Europe and the other in the Pacific; and though the problems of the one have little in common with those of the other except on certain general principles, they are, however, both capable of developing into a world war, and any great commotion in one tends to produce serious repercussions in the other. The distressing consequences of such eventualities and the memories of 1914-18 have made the world abhorrent to any major conflict. In the countries bordering on the Pacific, as in European countries, there is a genuine and prevalent desire for peace, and the peace of the Pacific depends to a considerable degree on the relations between China and Japan. Realizing the supreme importance of adjusting these relations, the two countries have tried once and again to devise some acceptable formulae for the solution of their various outstanding problems, and, unfortunately, the more they try to reconcile, the more they find that they cannot reconcile. The intermittent parleys conducted between Nanking and Tokyo have only revealed the difficulties of the task. The plain truth of the matter is that while China tries to preserve her rights and heritage, Japan persists in her expansionist policy, so that even if adjustment should prove possible, its duration and effectiveness would practically depend on the goodwill of Japan, and from past experiences such agreement not only restricts the action of one party only as the other party can always find some pretense when it suits her to contravene its terms, but it also serves the purpose of giving effect to those claims the validity of which is in doubt, and thus it clears the ground for further aggression. In these circumstances, it would not be difficult to see how by such gradual corrosion the very vitals of China's national life would before long be affected.

China's policy towards Japan is what any other country would pursue if similarly situated, namely, peace and self-preservation. The manifesto of the Third Plenary Session of the C.E.C. (February, 1937) and Dr. Wang Chung-hui's statement made public on his assumption of office (March, 1937) and his answers to the questions put to him by Japanese journalists in an interview with him all lay stress on the point that China, while defending the integrity of her territorial and sovereign rights, looks to an understanding with Japan on the basis of equality and reciprocity so that both may be benefited by it; and this attitude is traditional and in keeping with Confucian philosophy on which China's national psychology is still consciously or unconsciously based. As respects the main-

tenance of territorial and administrative integrity and the safeguarding of sovereign rights and vital interests, it is a duty the neglect of which will expose those responsible as well as the people to the severest condemnation. It is what a government and its defence forces are fundamentally for.

That the crux of Sino-Japanese amity hinges on the attitude of Japan is what every one can see. The obstacle in the way is the imperialistic ambition. As long as a nation seeks the gratification of this ambition at the expenses of a neighboring nation, no real and lasting friendship between them can be cultivated. The success of the Buenos Aires conference was due to the goodwill and mutual sympathy pervading in the participating countries, and this change of attitude from mutual suspicion and distrust into mutual assistance and mutual reliance was attributable mainly to the broad and liberal attitude of the leaders of the principal American countries who could think and act reasonably and without recourse to imperialistic means. There must be in Japan also such persons whose range of view extends beyond war trenches and who can see that mutual benefit and mutual sympathy make the best policy for any country in the long run. Machiavellian theories and policy might do a country good if the conditions of the world had remained the same as they were in the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, or Nineteenth century; but in a world which moves rapidly in the direction of political and economic nationalism and with the masses playing a more and more important rôle in the nation's social structure, it is extremely doubtful whether a country bent on conquest and aggrandizement will be able to work out its destiny, and even if it succeeds, the difficulties it will encounter will open its eyes to the mistake it will have made, and who knows how long it will be able to hold on.

Unfortunately the power in control in Japan today is a military party imbued with a war psychology. To trace Japan's relations with China since the Sino-Japanese war, 1894-5, is to go over the history of her persistent and incessant encroachment on China. I am not going to review the course of events which by degrees have tightened her grip on China, as they are too recent and too vivid to slip out of memory. Concerning her Manchurian adventure, Mr. Stimson's book on the Far Eastern Crisis and the Lytton Report furnish the most valuable information; and as to the events following that adventure, a very ably composed brochure by Mr. Hsu of the Council of International Affairs, Nanking, has clarified many points hitherto little

known though widely suspected. The fact is that when a country is deliberately resolved on war and conquest, it usually has definite preconceived plans. Modern Japan began her career in 1868. In the beginning her attention was absorbed in her consolidation of national power and liberation from foreign encroachment. But with the defeat of China, 1895, and then Russia, 1905, she became conscious of her strength and began to dream of an empire. Since then practically all her major moves have been in accordance with some premeditated scheme. Her assertion that when she started out with her Manchurian adventure she had "extremely vague plans" and she would at that time have been satisfied with something even less than what the Lytton Report contemplated appears, like many of her other contentions which look soft and innocuous, to be intended only for export and foreign consumption, and, therefore, it matters little if the statement does not tally with facts. However, the Japanese themselves have pointed to a man by the name of Komai as being "responsible for the whole Manchurian adventure." They say that he had conceived the plan long before September, 1931, when Honjo, Doihara, and the rest started to occupy this vast region which belonged to China.

The present crisis at Lukouchiao is another strategic move which she has given out as something in the nature of an outpost incident, none the less a very grave incident, for which China must "strictly be held responsible," and who in the world when dazed by all these intricacies and preoccupied with his own multifarious affairs would ever care to undergo all the trouble to clear his doubt as to whether the stupid Chinese have not as yet learned their lesson? Some time ago, it will be remembered, the Japanese asked permission of the Chinese in authority to station their troops temporarily at Fengtai, a place through which the railway from Hankow to Peiping, Suiyuan to Peiping, and Mukden to Peiping all pass, alleging that their barracks in Peiping had some construction work going on, and the courtesy as usual was extended. Soon afterwards, however, some unhappy incident developed. The Chinese troops there were held to blame, and thereupon the Chinese in authority were made to agree to replace them by other Chinese troops "not so unfriendly to the Japanese." On September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Mukden incident which led to the Japanese occupation of China's Northeastern Provinces now denominated "Manchoukuo", another unhappy incident happened and was said to be much more serious than the one preceding, and in order to avoid further clash between the Chinese and the Japanese troops when the latter should be engaged in their important exercises of night maneuvering and to maintain the "traditional friendship" between the two countries, China acceded to the Japanese demand—to withdraw her troops from Fengtai beyond a radius of five Chinese *li*. So the matter was "amicably settled", and all happily thought that the episode was closed.

Not far from Fengtai there is a place called Lukouchiao which to foreigners is known as Marco Polo Bridge. From this place to Peiping the distance is twenty-five *li*. Ten *li* to its east lies Fengtai, and five *li* to its west, Changhsintien.

Two national highways now run through it, intersecting each other. Its name was originally taken from a stone bridge which borders on the Yungting River on one side and a small city termed Wanpinghsien on the other. During the construction of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, an iron bridge was built to the northeast of this stone bridge, so that now Lukouchiao and the little city of Wanping have acquired a great strategic importance. The Japanese, after the September incident, last year, have been busy putting up some barracks at Fengtai. As they proceeded with their work of the barracks, they gradually came to fix their gaze on these strategic spots. By a coincidence, the Chinese troops in the Hopei-Charhar Area, like the others in the country, have since some time manifested some sentiments which are regarded as akin to nationalism and which the Japanese view with some degree of nervousness. All these facts are widely known and their significance fully comprehended in Peiping and Tientsin, and the people there have been anticipating trouble for some six months already.

There hardly seems any need for wasting words on the Boxer Protocol and all the rest as to whether military manoeuvres, by any stretch of imagination, or any strange rule of construction, could justifiably be conducted upon the land of a friendly country, on such an extensive scale, with such unrelaxing frequency, at such time of the day, and in places apparently having nothing whatsoever to do with the route between Peiping and the sea, for in Sino-Japanese relations these legal niceties are not material. What really matters is China's submission, and that without resistance. But it is only an Ethelred who "relies on present surrender to stave off future calamity".

It is well known that aside from military and political domination, Japan's aim is economic control of North China which she failed to extort from the Chinese government by seduction and intimidation. So she is now bringing force to bear, and hopes to dictate terms at the point of the sword. And all this is but part of a preconceived plan, the success of which, however, depends upon many factors and the manner of their development. It certainly looks serious to have a formidable foreign army stationed at a place like Fengtai-Lukouchiao. On the other hand, an army penetrating far into another country might also spell its own danger.

In this impending affair of Lukouchiao, as in her other dealings with China, Japan insists on local settlement. She took strong exception when the national government announced the only logical and correct stand that negotiations should be conducted through the proper channel of the central government and that settlement made locally to be valid must have its sanction. This *divide et impera* is characteristic of Japan's policy *vis-à-vis* China. Mr. Yusuke Tsurumi, speaking in a gathering of distinguished persons in London, said that in his belief the best form of government for China is "a federated government of autonomous provinces"; and that "the Japanese should help the northern provinces of China to create such a government with a view to its federation with the central government". During the discussion following his speech, one gentleman asked if he understood Mr. Tsurumi correctly that what he meant to

say was that the best way for Japan to govern China was to divide it into a number of autonomous provinces of which the northern provinces would be backed up by Japanese force. When it is remembered with what fervor and stir Japan is now building up a totalitarian state and how strongly centralized she already is now, it is indeed amusing to hear this recommendation of a federated government for China, whose chief cause of weakness was exactly this loose system of federation which she had all but in name during the long past and which is now breaking down with the gradual growth of national consciousness; and it would be still more amusing to note this extraordinary enthusiasm of Japan over China's form of government, when we come to consider that plainly it is China's concern, and none of Japan's, to see what sort of governmental system we need, and especially when we consider what rhyme or reason there could be that Japan would not introduce this system of federation, to which she takes such fancy, in her own land, or in Formosa, or Korea, or in the territory which she calls "Manchoukuo."

Japan contends that she has a surplus population which increases and that she cannot help looking for an outlet somewhere. But is it not that in hardly over forty years she has taken Formosa, Korea, and four of China's large provinces, besides many islands in the Pacific, so that she is today several times her size forty years ago? Miss Freda Utley points out that she has even left large parts of her own territory uncultivated, particularly in the Hokkaido, and, those who are familiar with the conditions prevailing in Formosa affirm that for the most part it is but sparsely populated. Moreover, judging from the past, it does not appear that she made much use of her outlets to which she had free access. There are now under her control vast regions which are capable of accomodating all of her surplus population for many hundreds of years to come. Do we see any indication that she is satisfied? And if she wants what is called "elbow room" to solve her population problem, what about China, with her huge population which increases numerically much more rapidly than is her case and with her territory dwindling in size all the time these many years?

The proximity of North China to the so-called "Manchoukuo" has been made another ground for the justification of her numerous impossible claims and predatory acts.

Underlying Factors in the North China Crisis

By POELIU DAI (戴葆璽)

THE withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Peiping and Tientsin marks the beginning of a new phase of Japanese continental expansion. The significance of this development can hardly be exaggerated. Hegemony over these principal cities will not only accelerate the consolidation of Japan's political as well as economic control over North China but also constitute a lasting menace to the exercise of sovereignty by the national government. In the present article, an attempt will be made to analyze the underlying factors leading to the present crisis.

The Political Factor:—The outbreak of hostilities in North China is not an isolated issue by itself but, on the contrary, represents a continuous development of Japanese

All the mummeries and juggleries that she performed before September, 1931, in China's northeastern provinces she now repeats in the northern provinces, and she is looking for some diplomatic note, like the Ishii-Lansing note, to complete her stunts. However, it seems a little premature to lay claim to five provinces when her foothold hardly extends beyond a fraction of one province.

The Japanese are from a race which is characterized by its intensive nationalism. Their achievements in the past seventy years have astounded the world. But they are hide-bound, and seized with a war mania. China is a weak nation. But she had her days of glory. She had a political system which was sufficient for her purpose before she came into contact with this modern world in which the nations are systematically organized and regimented. But at the moment of this contact, her system broke down. Some Western scholars, for want of an appropriate name, call China "a civilization", "a cultural group." But composed as she is fundamentally of one race, possessing one common language (at least written language), observing the same rules of conduct, following the same social manners and customs, worshipping the same gods, keeping the same festivals, having the same traditions, the same history, the same culture, etc., she is certainly more than a group, or civilization. Nevertheless, the fact remains that she is loosely organized and that she lacks a strong national sentiment. But things are changing, in China as elsewhere. There have gradually emerged from a past of internecine struggles political unity and national consciousness. If airplanes, radios, motor roads, motor cars, etc. have opened up China, they have also contributed to her unity and nationalism, which, once begun, tend to grow. And this phenomenon of the growth, and, in some countries, intensification, of nationalism is discernible not only in European countries, but also in Asiatic, particularly in Turkey, Arabia and Iran. If China's unity and nationalism have not quite taken root yet, indications, however, point to their continual growth, especially in this environment of the world. In these circumstances, it appears that Japan has started her conquest of China at least one generation too late. Besides, the outcome of war, any war, has never been very certain. Now that she has already resorted to the *ultima ratio*, perhaps it would be too much to expect that her better sense would still prevail.

militarism—a fact which admits no challenge. The Mukden incident of September 18, 1931, and the succession of events following it indicate clearly that Japan has wilfully embarked upon the policy of progressive destruction of China's territorial and administrative integrity. Although Sino-Japanese rapprochement, economic coöperation, "a new concept of China" and other similar slogans have been intermittently heralded by Japanese politicians, the military autocrats, by virtue of their peculiar constitutional position of not being subject to civil control, have dominated the Tokyo government and have consistently chosen positive actions for the realization of their desired ends. These medieval-minded warlords have been thorough-